Artificial Intelligence for Economics Nptel Week 5 Answers
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Nptel Artificial Intelligence for Economics Week 5 Answers (July-Dec 2025)
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Question 1. In the version of the ultimatum game with two periods and discount factor 8. the SPNE payoffs are given by (assuming A is the first mover and B is the second mover) About NP TEL α. ν = 1 – δ,να = δ b. v = 1, v = 0 How does an NPTEL online course work? c. v = 1 – 82, v = 82 d. None of the above
a) α. ν = 1 – δ, να = δ
b) v = 1, v = 0
c) v = 1 – 82, v = 82
d) None of the above
Question 2. What is the rationale for the infinitely repeated nature of a Rubenstein game?
a) It leads to pareto superior outcomes
b) Both players have an incentive to provide counter offers
c) None of the above
Question 3. In Rubenstein bargaining a player’s payoff is
a) Increases with increase in his own discount factor
b) Decreases with increase in his opponent’s discount factor
c) Both of the above
d) None of the above
These are Nptel Artificial Intelligence for Economics Week 5 Answers
Question 4. Which of the following is an example of strategic behaviour?
a) A firm builds excess capacity to discourage the entry of competitors.
b) A firm adopts the pricing behaviour of a dominant firm under the assumption that other firms will do likewise.
c) Firms in an industry increase advertising expenditures to avoid losing market share.
d) All of the above are examples of strategic behaviour.
Question 5. Game theory is concerned with
a) predicting the results of bets placed on games like roulette.
b) the choice of an optimal strategy in conflict situations.
c) utility maximization by firms in perfectly competitive markets.
d) the migration patterns of caribou in Alaska.
Question 6. Find the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium, assuming that when a player is indifferent between choosing two strategies, he chooses any one randomly with prob = 1/2
a) a1, (b1 or b2 with equal prob.)
b) a2, b3
c) a2, b4
Question 7. Which of the following statements is TRUE about a network of players
a) Network efficiency implies Pareto Efficiency
b) Pair wise Stability implies Efficiency
c) Pareto Efficiency implies Pair wise Stability
d) None of the above
These are Nptel Artificial Intelligence for Economics Week 5 Answers
Question 8. In presence of distance – based utility function
a) A pairwise stable network is never efficient
b) A pairwise stable network is sometime efficient depending on the cost of formation of a link
c) A Pairwise stable network is always efficient.
Question 9. Match the following for a network with ‘c’ being the cost of link formation
A1. c < (b(1) – b(2))
A2. c in( (b(1) – b(2)) , (b(1) + (n – 2)/2 * b(2))
A3. c > b(1) + (n – 2)/2 * b(2)
B1. Star Network is efficient
B2. Empty Network is efficient
B3. Complete network is efficient.
a) A1 -> B3, A2-> B1, A3 -> B2
b) A1-> B1, A2-> B2, A3 -> B3
c) A1 -> B2, A2-> B1, A3 -> B3
d) A1 -> B3, A2-> B2, A3 -> B1
Question 10. In a co-authorship network model the efficient network is characterized by
a) Disjoint pairs
b) Star
c) Complete network
d) empty network
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These are Nptel Artificial Intelligence for Economics Week 5 Answers